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Abstract
For optimal solutions in health care, decision makers inevitably must evaluate trade-offs, which call for multi-
attribute valuation methods. Researchers have proposed using best-worst scaling (BWS) methods which seek to
extract information from respondents by asking them to identify the best and worst items in each choice set. While
a companion paper describes the different types of BWS, application and their advantages and downsides, this
contribution expounds their relationships with microeconomic theory, which also have implications for statistical
inference. This article devotes to the microeconomic foundations of preference measurement, also addressing
issues such as scale invariance and scale heterogeneity. Furthermore the paper discusses the basics of preference
measurement using rating, ranking and stated choice data in the light of the findings of the preceding section.
Moreover the paper gives an introduction to the use of stated choice data and juxtaposes BWS with the
microeconomic foundations.
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Background
When searching for optimal solutions in health care, de-
cision makers inevitably must evaluate trade-offs, which
call for multi-attribute valuation methods [1]. Discrete-
choice experiment (DCE) methods have proven to be
particularly useful [2–6]. DCEs decompose choice alter-
natives into specific attributes or outcomes, permitting
to identify the implicit decision weights survey respon-
dents employ in making choices among combinations of
health and healthcare outcomes [7, 8]. More recently,
some researchers have proposed using best-worst scaling
(BWS) methods which seek to extract additional infor-
mation from respondents by asking them to identify the
best and worst items in each choice set. While a com-
panion paper (Mühlbacher et al. [1]) describes the differ-
ent types of BWS and their advantages and downsides,
this contribution expounds their relationships with
microeconomic theory, which also have implications for
statistical inference. It is structured as follows. Section 2
is devoted to the microeconomic foundations of prefer-
ence measurement, also addressing issues such as scale
invariance and scale heterogeneity. In Section 3, prefer-
ence measurement using rating and ranking data is dis-
cussed in the light of the findings of the preceding
section. Section 2 and Section 3 particularly are ad-
dressed to scholars in health sciences. After an introduc-
tion to the use of stated choice data in Section 4, BWS
is juxtaposed with the microeconomic foundations pre-
viously laid out (in Section 5). This has consequences
for experimental design which are spelled out in Section
6. Finally, Section 7 presents some conclusions and an
outlook on future research.
Microeconomic foundations
The objective of this section is to discuss concepts that
are at the core of microeconomic theory but may be un-
familiar to readers with a health sciences background.
These concepts will facilitate the assessment of BWS
methods in Section 5.
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Preferences and indifference curves
Individual preferences determine the relative perceived
satisfaction obtainable from various attributes or out-
comes of decisions. Preference relations are assumed to
conform to basic requirements of logic and consistency.
The term ‘utility’ denotes the mathematical representa-
tion of preference relations. Microeconomic theory as-
sumes that decision makers select alternatives that
maximize the value of their utility function, subject to
resource constraints [9]. Such choices thus result in the
highest obtainable level of subjective satisfaction.
Preference relations can be described using indifference
curves along which utility is held constant, implying that
the decision maker is indifferent between different combi-
nations of attributes. Indifference curves show how indi-
viduals evaluate subjective trade-offs among attributes.
Figure 1 illustrates trade-offs between length of life and
activities of daily living (an indicator of quality of life). The
status quo (point S) represents the conventional standard
of care, characterized by a long life (a1) but limitations on
activities of daily living (a2). Two indifference curves pass
through S, indicating combinations of attributes judged to
yield the same level of utility for patients A and B. Patient
B’s indifference curve has a steeper slope than that of pa-
tient A. This means that patient B places a relatively high
value on length of life because he or she needs to obtain a
comparatively high compensation in terms of activities of
daily living ΔaB2 to accept a given reduction in length of
life Δa1. In contrast, patient A places a relatively lower
value on quality of life and thus has a flatter indifference
curve indicating that a relatively small improvement ΔaA2
suffices to compensate him or her for the same reduction
in length of life Δa1. Thus the slope of an indifference
curve indicates the relative importance of an attribute and
therefore the structure of an individual’s subjective prefer-
ences. The slope of the indifference curve, e.g. ΔaA2 / Δa1,
is called the marginal rate of substitution.
Experiments to identify indifference curves
A controlled experiment with a sample of respondents
can help identify the preferences of individuals such as pa-
tient A. Let survey respondents be of type A. Make them
choose between the combination of attributes X (more ac-
tivities of daily living a2, clearly shorter length of life a1)
and the status quo S. If they choose X, then X evidently is
better than S (see Fig. 1 again), implying that A’s indiffer-
ence curve must pass below X. Next, the researcher mixes
the two attributes again, resulting in the combination Y.
Respondents now are asked to choose between the status
quo S and Y. Assume that respondents prefer S this time.
This means that their indifference curve passes above Y.
By repeating this procedure (including using points B[1]
and W[2] which will be of importance below), it is pos-
sible to identify the indifference curve. Its slope ΔaA2 =Δa1
shows that for respondents like patient A, a given im-
provement in quality of life indicated by activities of daily
living would have to be offset by a relatively large loss of
life years. The preference relations of respondents like pa-
tient B are quite different. Notably, combination X lies
below patient B’s indifference curve through the status
quo point S, causing B to prefer the status quo. The rea-
son is that B’s ratio ΔaB2=Δa1 is greater in absolute value
than A’s, indicating that a given loss of life years must be
compensated by a substantial improvement in quality of
life ΔaB2 for B’s utility to remain constant.
Fig. 1 Preference elicitation with DCE
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Deriving equivalents
Knowledge of the marginal rate of substitution between
quality and quantity of life makes it possible to derive
time equivalents for improvements in quality of life
analogous to conventional time equivalents. In addition,
DCE data can be used to identify the relative value of
health outcomes in terms of other equivalents. For ex-
ample, by replacing changes in length of life with
changes in net income that are associated with a move-
ment away from the status quo (see Fig. 1 again), one
obtains the individual’s marginal willingness to pay for a
small improvement in the quality of life. Longevity could
also be replaced with the risk of a serious side effect to
derive maximum acceptable risk for an increase in qual-
ity of life (e.g. brought about a therapy). Therefore, an
individual’s risk-efficacy trade-off can be estimated; in-
deed, outcome equivalents can be derived for any con-
tinuous attribute.
Up to this point, focus has been on marginal changes
in one attribute. However, the logic of the argument ex-
tends to discrete changes in treatment profiles that allow
for combinations of changes in multiple attributes. Using
DCE data to quantify preference relations among mul-
tiple attributes makes it possible to calculate time,
money, or risk equivalents of changes in total utility be-
tween two treatment profiles or between a treatment
profile and the status quo [10]. Therefore, a DCE can be
used to evaluate both changes in individual attributes as
well as combinations of attributes associated with deci-
sions bearing on resource allocation.
Scale invariance
Basing the analysis on microeconomic theory has the
crucial advantage of scale invariance. Metrics based on
the slope of the indifference curve do not depend on the
scaling of the attributes considered, rendering the inter-
pretation of results invariant to scale. This can be shown
as follows. Let U = f (a1, a2) be the utility function indi-
cating an individual’s subjective valuation of attribute
combinations. By definition, utility is constant along an
indifference curve, so ΔU must be zero. As a change ΔU
can only result from changes in the levels of attributes
Δa1 and Δa2, one has
ΔU ¼ ∂f
∂a1
⋅Δa1 þ ∂f∂a2 ⋅Δa2 ¼ 0 ð1Þ
with ∂f/∂a1 and ∂f/∂a2 indicating the marginal utility of
unit changes in the respective attributes. By solving for
Δa2/Δa1, one obtains the slope of the indifference curve
(see Fig. 1 again),
Δa2
Δa1
¼ − ∂f =∂a2
∂f =∂a1
ð2Þ
Now let the utility function be transformed by any
positive affine transformation φ(⋅). Such a transform-
ation causes differences in attributes to have a stronger
or weaker impact on utility, respectively. With Ũ = φ(U),






⋅Δa1 þ ∂φ∂f ⋅
∂f
∂a2
⋅Δa2 ¼ 0 ð3Þ




¼ − ∂φ=∂f ⋅∂f =∂a2
∂φ=∂f ⋅∂f =∂a1
¼ − ∂f =∂a2
∂f =∂a1
ð4Þ
Thus the slope of an indifference curve is not affected
by a change in scaling. Note that this invariance result
includes scalings that affect attributes differently as long
as φ(⋅) is order-preserving, since these partial transfor-
mations can still be represented by a single φ(⋅)
function.
Scale heterogeneity
The foregoing argument relates to scale transformations
in the sense of order-preserving adjustments in the
metric used to assign numbers to an individual utility
function. As shown, such transformations have no effect
on the shapes of individual indifference curves. However,
empirical estimates are based on a sample of individuals,
for whom a linear-additive specification of a random
utility function is often postulated (see Section 5.1
below),
Uij = βaij +
εij
σ (5)
there i indexes individuals, j indexes choice alternatives,
a is a vector of attributes that varies not only with choice
alternatives j but also individuals I as soon as “net in-
come” is an attribute (through the price attribute), β is a
vector of marginal utilities corresponding to ∂f/∂a, εij is
an error term capturing the effect of unobserved factors,
including idiosyncratic preferences for unobserved attri-
butes, and σ is the scale of the error term determining
its variance. This scale is not identified in most empirical
models and usually normalized to 1 [11].
Suppose, however, that σ is individual-specific, so the
scale actually is σi. Replacing σ by σi in (5) and multiply-
ing through by σi, one obtains
~Uij ¼ βσ ið Þaij þ εij ð6Þ
Thus the marginal utility parameters β are scaled up
or down proportionally across individuals by σi. Assum-
ing σi = 1 for all individuals preserves the results (1–4)
for a sample of individuals but neglects inherent hetero-
geneity across individuals. In principle, scale also could
vary across choice sets j in a preference-elicitation sur-
vey because of learning and fatigue, sequence effects,
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and pairing of the same choice profile with other profiles
so that
~Uij ¼ βσ ij Zð Þ
 
aij þ εij ð7Þ
where Z is a vector of covariates in the scale function.
Thus estimated marginal utility parameters β^ ¼ βσ ij Zð Þ
potentially are confounded with scale effects both across
individuals and within individuals across choice questions.
Some authors have argued that scale heterogeneity ef-
fectively invalidates all conventional approaches to esti-
mating choice models [12]. Choice-modelling strategies
such as the Generalized Multinomial Logit model offer a
way to obtain separate estimates of taste and scale pa-
rameters [13]. Also, using a DCE to identify a single in-
difference curve (as predicated by microeconomic
theory) eliminates scale differences both across attributes
and individuals (see Section 5.3 below).
Preference measurement using rating and ranking data
The rating procedure calls for indicating total utility on
a categorical Likert or continuous visual-analogue rating
scale. These scales usually have defined endpoints indi-
cating minimum and maximum values [14]. While these
preference measures are easy to obtain, they have meth-
odological weaknesses. First, rating responses tend to
discriminate poorly among categories, causing the values
obtained to exhibit insufficient variability. Because there
are no tradeoffs involved, respondents tend to ignore
relative importance and say that everything is important,
giving rise to ceiling effects [15]. In terms of Fig. 1, all
the alternatives appear to lie on the same indifference
curve, which results in illogical rankings of naturally or-
dered alternatives.
Second, responses often are influenced by social atti-
tudes resulting in yea-saying and nay-saying bias. In the
introductory example, type-A patients could be under
the impression that length of life is valued very highly by
society, causing them to overstate ratings for longevity.
Arguably, yea-saying also could bias a DCE to the extent
that respondents of type B opt too frequently for the al-
ternative with a higher score for activities of daily living.
However, DCEs usually call for choices between alterna-
tives that differ in terms of several attributes, making it
more difficult to identify socially acceptable alternatives.
Third, ratings are a difficult cognitive task, requiring
evaluation of the intensity of preference on a predeter-
mined numerical scale [14]. This can result in measure-
ment error; it is much easier for respondents to say they
prefer one alternative to another than to assign a num-
ber to the degree they prefer one alternative to another.
In addition, cultural response styles may differ among
countries [16]. Fourth, microeconomic theory postulates
that respondents value attributes in relation to each
other, as discussed in the context Fig. 1 [14, 17]. If the
theory is descriptive of choice behaviour, the rating for-
mat will not produce reliable preference data [18].
More importantly, ratings assume utility to be a car-
dinal construct such that a given score measures the
same utility across individuals and a given difference in
score is associated with the same difference in utility
under all circumstances. Yet for predicting choice, it is
sufficient to compare alternatives in terms of “better” or
“worse” (see Fig. 1 again). Therefore, utility is an ordinal
construct in microeconomic theory. In return, the curva-
ture of the indifference curve indicates that the ratio of
marginal utilities is not a constant but depends on the
individual’s position in attribute space [see eq. (4)], im-
plying that the assumption of constant ß’s in eq. (5) can
be a local approximation at best.
To illustrate the difficulty with ratings as a cardinal
construct, assume that two alternatives have 50 and 60
points on the rating scale, respectively. In Fig. 1, let this
10 point difference correspond to the distance between
points X and Y. For type-A patients, such a difference
reflects a substantial difference in utility. Yet for type-B
patients, the same numerical difference could indicate a
small difference in utility since both points lie at a con-
siderable distance from their indifference curve through
the status quo S. For instance, let attribute a1 be associ-
ated with utility values 10, 20, and 30 and a2, with values
20, 40, and 60 indicating that the third alternative with
values (30, 60) is preferred. Here, attribute a2 appears to
be twice as important as a1. However, one could have
assigned the values 10, 20, and 30 to attribute a2 as well,
causing a1 and a2 to appear equally important. Yet the
researcher would observe that the individual opts for the
third alternative again, regardless of the numerical scaling
of the attributes. This implies that it is impossible to infer
an absolute scale from observed choices or to make infer-
ences by comparing numerical values between individuals.
Therefore, microeconomic theory suggests that rank-
ing, which respects the ordinal property of utility, is su-
perior to rating in terms of validity and reliability of
responses. Just stating that the alternative 30 is better
than the alternative 20 which in turn is better than the
10 is sufficient [19]. Still, the challenge is to come up
with a complete preference ordering over all outcomes
of interest. While the ranking method is in agreement
with microeconomic theory, it has several weaknesses.
For researchers, designing a ranking task is far more de-
manding than a DCE; for respondents, it imposes a
heavy cognitive burden. While it usually is relatively easy
to rank alternatives at the top and bottom, ranking of al-
ternatives in the middle of a long list has shown to be
unreliable [20]. To avoid this, the number of alternatives
must be small, which also limits the number of attri-
butes (respondents would need to be presented with
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many alternatives for ensuring that each attribute is in-
cluded at least once in a bundle).
Preference measurement using stated choice data
Relying on stated choices is closest to everyday expres-
sion of preference; moreover, it is consistent with micro-
economic theory. In the conventional DCE format
respondents select only one alternative at a time, which
provides no information about the ordering of alterna-
tives not chosen. Because relatively little preference in-
formation is obtained from choices among two or three
alternatives, it is necessary to have respondents answer a
series of choice questions. A review of health DCEs
found that the typical number of choice questions
ranged from 8 to 12 [21]. Still, there are two situations
where choice data can be uninformative about respond-
ent preferences. They are uninformative when respon-
dents either always pick the alternative with the better
level of one attribute or always pick the status-quo or
opt-out alternative. These choice patterns fail to provide
the information about trade-offs that is required to esti-
mate marginal rates of substitution. They imply that in-
difference curves are straight vertical or horizontal lines
[18, 22]. Although indifference curves of this type are
implausible, they may be the consequence of experimen-
tal design that does not offer sufficiently attractive alter-
natives to one featuring a strongly preferred attribute or
to the status quo.
Best-worst scaling
Several early contributions pointed out that some of the
approaches described up to this point put high cognitive
demands on respondents while others have weaknesses
from the vantage point of measurement theory [23, 24].
As a response to these criticisms, BWS was developed in
the late 1980s as an alternative to existing methods [25, 26].
Flynn (2010) distinguishes three cases of BWS which
have in common that respondents, rather than just
identifying the best alternative, simultaneously select
the best and worst alternative from a set of three or
more alternatives [27–29]. One of the three possible
variants is very similar to DCEs, making it well an-
chored in microeconomic theory (for more descriptive
detail, see the companion paper [1]). All variants have
one thing in common: they require respondents to
examine all alternatives comprising a choice scenario
and to perform a dual choice by identifying not only the
best but also the worst attribute, attribute level, or com-
bination of multiple attribute levels [30, 31]. The result-
ing data thus identify pairs of alternatives with
maximum differences in utility [32]. The remainder of
this section is devoted to a critical discussion of the
three variants of BWS in the light of microeconomic
theory.
Object case BWS
The first variant of BWS is the attribute or object case.
It is the original form of BWS as proposed by Finn and
Louviere [33], designed to determine the relative im-
portance of attributes [29]. Accordingly, attributes have
no (or only one) level, and choice scenarios differ
merely in the particular subset of attributes shown. Re-
spondents are asked to identify the most and least pre-
ferred attribute from the scenario list [28]. The number
of scenarios required to identify a complete ranking de-
pends on the number of attributes. The BWS object
case originally was conceived as a replacement of trad-
itional methods of preference measurement such as rat-
ings and Likert scales [29].
The object case avoids problems that occur with rating
scales because it normalizes all relative-importance
weights to the (0,1) interval and thus eliminates scale ar-
tefacts as shown in equations (5–7). In principle, there-
fore, it facilitates valid comparisons of preference [34]. It
also reduces social-desirability bias because it makes re-
spondents evaluate trade-offs between attributes [35].
For this reason, ties in orderings are rare compared to
rating data. These advantages have motivated the use of
the object case for assessing health states, quality of life,
and worker satisfaction [36, 37].
However, the object scaling variant of BWS lacks
accuracy and discriminating power. The example of
two different patient types (“patient A” and “patient
B”) of Fig. 1 illustrates this problem. Both types need
to choose between alternative treatments. As before,
let the two attributes be length of life (a1) and im-
provement in activities of daily living (a2). However,
object case BWS forces them to take on just two
values, 0 (not present in scenario) and 1 (present in
scenario).
As shown in Fig. 2, this reduces the set of possible al-
ternatives to four, represented by the points (0,0), (0,1),
(1,0), and (1,1). As in Fig. 1, the objective is to determine
the slope of the indifference curve, reflecting the relative
importance of the two attributes. However, point (0,0)
mirroring “worst” is not informative since no indiffer-
ence curve can possibly go through it (any other bundle
of attributes is better). The same is true of point (1,1)
since all other bundles are worse.
Panel A of Fig. 2 depicts patient A, whose indiffer-
ence curve has relatively flat slope, indicating that ac-
tivities of daily living are relatively important. Only
point (0,1) qualifies as the origin of the indifference
curve because point (1,0), associated with a total loss
of activities of daily living, is unacceptable for this type
of respondent. This leaves all indifference curves
bounded by I’ and I”in the possible set. The “best”
choice can only be (1,1), and the “worst” one, (0,0).
With these weak restrictions, object case BWS fails to
Mühlbacher et al. Health Economics Review  (2016) 6:5 Page 5 of 12
limit the set of admissible indifference curves and their
slopes.
Panel B of Fig. 2 depicts patient B, whose indifference
curve has a relatively steep slope, indicating that longev-
ity is important compared to activities of daily living. As
in panel A, points (0,0) and (1,1) cannot be the origin of
an indifference curve. Point (0,1) is unacceptable for
someone with a strong preference for gaining life years.
This leaves point (0,1), from which any indifference
curve can originate as long as its slope (in absolute
value) is less than that of patient A depicted in panel A.
The set of admissible indifference curves therefore is
bounded only by I”’ and I’v; it cannot be identified any
further using object case BWS.
Object case BWS thus has a serious drawback since its
attributes take on only the value 1 (present) or 0 (not
present) rather than a set of levels. Therefore, researchers
cannot know what level respondents impute to a specific
attribute relative to other attributes. Furthermore, the
slopes of the indifference curves pertaining to respondents
with different preferences cannot be identified with any
precision. Object case data thus do not permit to deter-
mine the relative importance of attributes or to compare
it between respondents with differing preferences.
Fig. 2 Preference Elicitation with BWS Object Case
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Profile case BWS
The second BWS variant is the profile case [38]. Here,
the same attributes appear in each scenario but differ in
terms of their levels, with respondents identifying both
the “best” and “worst” attribute level in each scenario
shown [27]. Profile case BWS has advantages relative to
both the object case and DCEs. In contrast to object
case BWS, respondents explicitly value attribute levels,
making choices much more transparent and informative.
Compared to a DCE, respondents evaluate only one pro-
file scenario at a time, which obviates correctly combining
profiles. Also, the cognitive burden of the preference-
elicitation task may be reduced, permitting the number of
attributes to be increased [12].
However, the profile case has three weaknesses. First,
at least in its so-called maxdiff formulation, it assumes a
cardinal utility function, which causes the difficulties
expounded in Section 3 above. In particular, the maxdiff
model assumes that BWX (x, y), x ≠ y, is proportional to
b(x)/b(y), with x and y denoting two alternatives (points
in Fig. 1), BWX denoting the best-worst distance, and
b(x) and b(u) symbolizing two utility values that are de-
fined by u(x) = log b(x) and u(y) = log b(y), respectively.
Evidently, the best-worst distance is expressed in terms
of cardinal utility [12, 32].
Second, the maxdiff approach fails to determine the
relative importance of attributes. Recall from Fig. 1 that
the slope of the indifference curve indicates the relative
importance for small changes in levels. For example, in
Fig. 1 let B[1] be the “best” level of attribute a1, and
W[1], the “worst”, as identified by patient A. This valu-
ation holds all other attributes constant at a given level,
which must be specified in a well-designed experiment.
For simplicity, the status-quo value is used here. Accord-
ingly, W[1] and B[1] lie on a horizontal line through
point S (the status quo), while W[2] and B[2] lie on a
vertical line through S. The relative importance of an at-
tribute is indicated by the angle α, which shows the sac-
rifice of length of life that would be acceptable in return
for improved activities of daily living (see panel A of
Fig. 3).
According to profile case BWS, this angle is given by
the ratio of maxdiff values, i.e. {B[2]–W[2]} / {B[1]–
W[1]} (note that in panel A of Fig. 3, the vertical dis-
tance {B[2]–W[2]} has to be moved to originate from
W[1] in order to determine the angle). This ratio defines
the (tangent of ) angle ã. However, ã differs substantially
from the true angle a, causing the researcher to errone-
ously conclude that length of life is very important to a
person like patient A because any loss in this attribute
would have to be highly compensated by an improve-
ment in activities of daily living.
Third, the profile case also discriminates poorly among
respondents with different preferences. Note that while
the indifference curves of patients A and B have differ-
ent slopes, the two respondents could agree on their
best and worst values both with regard to attribute α1
(given α2 is at its status-quo-level) and α2 (given α1 is at
its status-quo level). Thus, in panel B of Fig. 3 profile
case BWS yields the angle ~β , which clearly exceeds the
true slope β of the indifference curve in the neighbour-
hood of point S. However, differences in utility are likely
to differ between individuals. For instance, let the dis-
tance between B[2] and W[2] be associated with one
utility difference for patient B but another utility differ-
ence for patient A. This is equivalent to a transformation
φ(⋅) of utility from U to Ũ, as discussed in Section 2
above. In particular, let the difference in utility for pa-
tient B be only one-half of that of patient A (λ = 0.5).
This causes the measured angle ~β to become 0.5 ~β –
much smaller than β. Comparing 0.5 ~β (punctuated line)
with the angle ã > 0.5 ~β of panel A of Fig. 3 (dashed
line), the researcher would erroneously conclude that
length of life is more important to patient A than to pa-
tient B because A seemingly needs to be more highly
compensated by improvement in activities of daily living.
Thus profile case BWS may result in wrong inferences
about differences in preferences if unobserved heterogen-
eity is present. This effectively is the critique BWS propo-
nents level against DCE estimates. However, as long as the
objective is to estimate marginal rates of substitution
(which it should be), the two pertinent Uij = (βσi)aij + εij
value in eq. (6) are divided by each other, leaving the ratio
of β ' s unaffected. Only if σi is a function of individual co-
variates Z [as in eq. (7)] does heterogeneity cause bias in
the estimation of marginal rates of substitution based on a
DCE.
Multiprofile case BWS
The third BWS variant is the multiprofile case [29, 39].
Contrary to the two previous cases, respondents repeat-
edly choose between alternatives defined by full outcome
profiles that include all the attributes set at different
levels in a sequence of choice sets. Thus, the multiprofile
case BWS amounts to a best-worst discrete-choice ex-
periment (BWDCE). A BWDCE extracts more informa-
tion from a choice scenario than a conventional DCE
because it asks not only for the “best” (i.e. most pre-
ferred) but also the “worst” (least preferred) alternative.
Multiprofile case BWS has been used but rarely for pref-
erence measurement in health care, although BWDCE re-
sults are as reliable as those from conventional DCEs [40].
This is to be expected in view of Fig. 1; indeed, since the
objective of a DCE is to identify an indifference curve, it is
questionable how ‘best’ and’worst’ alternatives do add
more information. One might argue, that ‘best’ and’worst’
are simply alternatives lying above and below the
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indifference curve (through the status quo point). There-
fore, the claim that BWDCE yields more accurate mea-
surements thanks to the additional information extracted
lacks a theoretical foundation [12]. BWDCE just adds
more information with regard to a single choice set.
Another important distinction is that BWDCEs call
for a judgment as to which alternatives are “best” and
“worst”. In contrast, DCEs ask which alternative the re-
spondent would actually choose among those available.
Conceivably, respondents might judge an alternative
“best” they would not end up choosing. This could easily
occur if the design lacks a price attribute, whereas
respondents become aware of it when “choice” is
mentioned in the DCE. Therefore, BWSDCE judgment
data need not have the same utility-theoretic properties
as DCE data. Nevertheless, BWSDCE data often are ana-




Several methods are available for choosing attributes
that can be used in combination [41]. Direct approaches
include the elicitation technique, the repertory grid
method as well as directly asking for attributes relative
subjective importance [42]. All essential attributes
Fig. 3 Preference Elicitation with the BWS Profile Case
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should appear in the choice scenarios to avoid specifica-
tion error in estimating the utility function [5, 26].
With the relevant attributes identified, their levels
need to be defined (at least for profile and multiprofile
BWS). Their ranges represent the perceived differences
in respondent utility associated with the most and least
preferred level. However, the reverse is not true: A re-
spondent’s maximum difference in utility may fall short
of or exceed the spread between levels as imposed by
the experiment. Also, requiring attribute levels to be
realistic appears intuitive. Yet, the experiment also calls
for a spreading of levels, especially in the price attribute
(assuming willingness-to-pay values are to be calcu-
lated). The reason becomes evident from considering
Fig. 1 again. There, the unknown indifference curve can
be interpolated best if respondents "jump back and
forth" across it. Thus, the researcher must trade off two
objectives. On the one hand, a data set as complete as
possible is desirable, calling for attribute levels to be in a
realistic range. On the other hand, it is important to be
able to estimate the regression parameter associated with
the price attribute as precisely as possible because being
an estimate of the (negative of ) marginal utility of in-
come, income, − ∂f/∂a1, it enters the calculation of all
willingness-to-pay values.
In principle, attributes can be measured on both nom-
inal and ordinal scales. However, qualitative (nominally
or ordinally scaled) descriptions provide respondents
with room for interpretation. This can bias the results
because of ambiguity, as was seen in the discussion of
profile case BWS, by simply modifying the vertical dis-
tance {B[2]–W[2]} in Fig. 3. This would reflect failure of
the respondent to correctly locate e.g. point B[2] in attri-
bute space. Respondents also may reinterpret numerical
levels by recoding them qualitatively as low, medium,
and high in an attempt to simplify comparisons.
Experimental design
Survey design involves the construction of scenarios
comprising combinations of attributes or attribute levels.
As in the case of a DCE, there are several options avail-
able for BWS. From a complete list of possible combina-
tions, suitable designs can be created manually by
judiciously balancing several criteria, viz. the number of
scenarios involving high and low (assumed) utility
values, low correlation of attributes (orthogonality), bal-
anced representation, and minimum overlap of levels
[43]. If the reduced number of choice scenarios to be
presented to respondents turns out to be still excessive,
design blocks have to be created.
A frequently used alternative is the Balanced Incom-
plete Block Design (BIBD) [44]. For guidance concerning
creation, analysis and operationalization of manual de-
signs, the main reference is Cochran and Cox (1992),
who created a multitude of ready-to-use BIBDs [45].
Ways to increase design efficiency are described in
Chrzan and Orme (2000) and Louviere et al. (2000)
[46, 47]. More recently, optimal and near-optimal de-
signs complementing the manual approach have been
developed [48].
Rather than manually developing a design, researchers
can use automated (often computerized) procedures. For
example, the software package SAS offers several search
algorithms to determine the most efficient design of a
given experiment [43]. However, efficient designs might
result in biased estimates owing to some respondents
using simplistic heuristics [49]. As shown in Flynn et al.
(2015) higher efficiency in the design can be associated
with smaller regression coefficients, suggesting either
weaker preferences or lower choice consistency [49].
Simple orthogonal main-effect design plans (OMEPs)
are available as well (e.g. in SPSS). Easy to use, they have
been popular in BWS. However, OMEPs have the disad-
vantage that they do not allow marginal rates of substi-
tution to depend on the level of attributes. This
contradicts the convexity of the indifference curve. For
example a loss in terms of activities of daily living needs
to be offset only slightly by more of another attribute as
long as the status quo contains much of it but needs to
be highly compensated when it is scarce (indicated by
points to the left of S in Fig. 3). In a (linearized) utility
function U = f(a1, a2), this calls for interaction terms of
the type (a1 ⋅ a2),
U ¼ γ0 þ γ1⋅a1 þ γ2⋅a2 þ γ3⋅ a1⋅a2ð Þ þ  ð8Þ
such that, evaluated at the expected value of the disturb-
ance term, E(ϵ) = 0,
∂U
∂a1




¼ γ2 þ γ3⋅a1 ð10Þ
Zi This means that the marginal utility of an attribute
depends on values of other attributes, a property that
cannot be represented by an orthogonal design. Note
also that by including interaction terms of the type
(aj ⋅ Zi), marginal utility and hence the marginal rate of
substitution can be made to depend on an individual
characteristic (for an application to individuals with and
without chronic conditions, see e.g. Mc Neil Vroomen &
Zweifel 2011 [4]). This serves to reduce the scope of
preference heterogeneity to truly unobserved influences.
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Statistical inference
In reality, researchers cannot know all determinants of
utility; they must accept that observed choices contain a
random element. In addition, respondents make errors
in making hypothetical choices, as they do in their daily
lives.
Random utility theory, developed by McFadden (1974,
1986), permits modelling decisions as a stochastic
process [50, 51]. This model assumes maximization of
expected utility (i.e. on average, after many repetitions)
[52]. This is a much weaker behavioral standard than
traditional utility maximization because it allows for re-
spondents to be off target in any single choice, but on
target on average.
Suppressing the index denoting the individual, equa-
tion (11) denotes the empirical indirect utility function
for continuous or categorical attributes, where Uj is the
individual’s utility for alternative j,Vj is the deterministic
component, and εj is the random component,
Uj ¼ V j þ εj; j ¼ 1; …; J ð11Þ
The error term is assumed to follow a Gumbel or
Type 1 extreme-value distribution, with expected value
zero and constant variance. However, the usual inde-
pendence assumption does not hold in this case because
the same individual makes a series of evaluations during
the experiment. For instance, someone who tends not to
discriminate between bad alternatives is likely to commit
the same type of error in the maxdiff procedure (the
maxdiff procedure calls for identifying the maximum dif-
ference in utility, see Section 5.2 above). Thus, as shown
in equations (5) to (7), the error term should include a
scale function with arguments Z to account for scale
variation among respondents, among attributes, across
questions, and to accommodate sequence effects,
Uj ¼ V j þ εj
σ Zð Þ ; j ¼ 1; …; J ð12Þ
To simplify the discussion, assume σ(Z) = 1. It follows
that the random utilities of the best and worst alterna-
tives are
Ub ¼ Vb þ b ð13Þ
Uw ¼ −Vw−w; ð14Þ
respectively. According to the random utility model, the
alternatives with the highest and lowest utility have the
highest probability of being chosen as the best and worst
alternatives,





P wð Þ ¼ P Uw ¼ maxj∈C −Uj
 
and
P b;wjCð Þ ¼ P Ub > Uj > Uw
 	
; ∀ j∈C− b;wf g; b≠w
ð16Þ
where C− {b,w} is the choice set C without alternatives b
and w.
For the MNL choice model, the probability PB of
choosing alternative j as “best” from choice set C is given
by





However, BWS requires a dual choice of both the best
and the worst alternative. Conventional MNL cannot be
applied to BWS without modification because it deals
only with the choice of one alternative [31]. One solu-
tion is to split the two choices into two independent de-
cisions, as in rank or exploded logit analysis where the
probability of choosing alternative w as “worst” is based
on the alternatives remaining after alternative b is re-
moved. Then, the joint probability of the two choices
P(b,w|C) is the product of the individual probabilities,










Alternatively, the maxdiff model assumes that respon-
dents choose the best-worst pair out of all possible or-
dered pairs from the scenario with the greatest utility
difference,
ΔUbw ¼ Vb−Vw þ ℰb−ℰw; ð19Þ
resulting in the joint probability





e V j−Vkð Þ
ð20Þ
Conclusions and outlook
While object case BWS and profile case BWS have been
found to have weakness, multiprofile case BWS is in ac-
cordance with microeconomic theory. The demonstrated
problems associated with BWS are particularly severe
when individual’s preferences are not homothetic (intro-
ducing within-individual heterogeneity) and if prefer-
ences between individuals are heterogeneous. Moreover,
it has been shown to provide results of comparable
reliability as DCEs, regardless of design and sample size
[28, 39]. Thus multiprofile case BWS (also known as
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DCEBWS), is best viewed as a refinement of the conven-
tional DCE which opens up new opportunities in health
economics and health services research. In particular,
extracting additional information about preference from
each respondent facilitates assessment of preference het-
erogeneity among respondents through the use of inter-
action terms involving individual characteristics in the
random utility function to be estimated.
Physicians, researchers, and regulators often are poorly
informed about the advantages and limitations of stated-
preference methods. Despite the increased commitment
to patient-centered healthcare, healthcare decision makers
do not fully realize that knowledge of the subjective rela-
tive importance of outcomes to those affected is needed to
maximize the health benefits of available healthcare tech-
nology and resources. Therefore, the collection of prefer-
ence data that can measure preferences and differences in
preferences in a valid way using DCEs and DCEBWS is of
decisive importance for health economics and health ser-
vices research.
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